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ABSTRACT
There are several standard approaches to risk analysis rec-
ommended for use in information security, however, the ac-
tual application of risk analysis by security analysts follows
an opaque mix of standard risk analysis procedures and
adaptations based on an analyst’s understanding of risk.
We refer to these approaches as Folk Risk Analysis. To
understand folk risk analysis, we present the results of a
study where Distributed Cognition and Grounded Theory
were used to elicit factors influencing risk interpretation by
security analysts, and the constrained conditions to risk de-
cision making they encounter.
1. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental challenge in designing systems for security
analysts is understanding how they make decisions about
security risk. One approach to addressing this challenge lies
in the identification and understanding of factors that influ-
ence the analyst’s interpretation of risk and the appreciation
of constraints in the analyst’s operations; these can uncover
the analyst’s translation of risk. Risk analysis is rarely a
straight forward or rational process, and by understanding
the risk analysis practices that analysts deploy, system de-
signed can better address them [27, 35].
This paper aims to contribute to system design for security
by increasing the visibility of decision making activities se-
curity analysts carry out during risk analysis. A large pro-
portion of an analyst’s activities revolves around directly
or indirectly eliciting and analysing risks. Activities range
from intrusion detection and incident response, to systems
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administration [22]. In a bid to preserve consistency, we fo-
cused our study’s scope on risk analysis undertaken during
vulnerability analysis.
The work was motivated by the question: how do security
analysts make decisions about risk, given that risk analy-
sis, is rarely a rational process? Our findings show that
decision making on risk is a matter a consolidated effort be-
tween analysts, artefacts, and facilitated by communication
and awareness. In addition, we identify that these factors
are insufficient in addressing constraints resulting from goal
conflicts when context is not considered in specifying secu-
rity requirements.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows; we consider
the related work on risk and risk perceptions, and activities
of security analysts in Section 2, before presenting our study
approach and data collection method in Sections 3 and 4 re-
spectively. We analyse the data in Section 5, present the
findings in Section 6, and discuss them in Section 7. Con-
clusions and future work are discussed in Section 8.
2. RELATED WORK
2.1 Risk and Risk Analysis
Risk is a term traditionally designated as the possibility of
objective danger that could not be traced back to wrong-
ful conduct [19], but is now synonymous with some form of
threat, danger or hazard. Techno-scientific approaches to
risk expand on this synonym by incorporating the proba-
bility of harm occurring, i.e. the product of the probability
and consequences (the magnitude and severity) of an adverse
event [8]. Two forms of risk are dominant in the literature:
objective risk and perceived risk [24].
Objective risk appeals to the techno-scientific definition of
risk in that it is stated scientifically and capable of mea-
surement; this definition provides the basis for risk analysis
and management techniques used by security analysts. Per-
ceived risk relates to the subjective assumptions people hold
about future events. Perceived risk is characterised by theo-
ries around risk compensation, e.g. [12, 34, 2] which describe
how different people have different propensities to take risk,
this propensity is influenced by the potential rewards of risk
taking, and that risk perceptions vary not just by individual,
but also by culture.
Risk management processes put objective risk to action.
The premise behind management processes is that the use
of predetermined sets of procedures can help manage and
reduce risk, but an analyst’s failure to understand and fol-
low these procedures is a recurring problem in security [30].
Moreover, risk management processes are optimal only in
static, well-ordered situations where risk has been pre-defined
and, if too much trust is placed in these processes, the re-
sulting outputs may increase residual risk [17].
2.2 Decision Making and Risk
The related work concerning decision making and risk ap-
pears to be concerned with perceived rather than objective
risk, and the incoherent nature of risk perception and inter-
pretation for decision making.
Beautement et al. [5] discuss factors that influence decision
making in security compliance by employees. They intro-
duced the term compliance budget, by which they argued
that security compliance is a finite resource and the lengths
at which a person is willing to comply depends on the per-
ceived reward to the individual. Although this work is not
primarily concerned with security analysts, it does raise the
intriguing question of whether security analysts view aspects
of risk analysis as tradable resources and, if so, how these
might be identified.
Asgharpour et al. [4] identified that the communication of
risk is an important factor in computer security. However,
they state that the interpretation of risk by communicating
parties differs based on the mental models (understanding)
used to translate risk terminology from expert to non-expert.
This, in turn, renders the goal of risk communication inef-
fective when there is a mismatch.
2.3 The Work of Security Analysts
D’Amico et al. [11] reviewed security analysts work pro-
cesses when defending against attacks by analysing work-
flows, decision processes and cognitive demands. They iden-
tified that security analysis activities flow through three
stages of cognitive data fusion and three stages of situa-
tion awareness. However, their findings appear limited to
the cognitive challenges the analysts encounter and do not
consider their socio-technical challenges.
Werlinger et al. [37] report on incidence response practices
of security analysts. They identify the tasks, skills, strate-
gies and tools analysts use to understand security incidents.
Botta et al [7] continue from this by using Distributed Cogni-
tion to study group dynamics in Information Security Man-
agement (We define Distributed Cognition in Section 5).
Their aim was to verify the influencers of Distributed Cog-
nition in Information Security Management, and the factors
leading to its failure. Their results, however, did not identify
independent constraints that could lead to Distributed Cog-
nition failures and only highlighted the lack of its influencing
norms and cues.
Sundaramurthy et [31] also address the issue of failure with
security analysts by using Grounded Theory to investigate
factors leading to security analyst’s burnout in Security Op-
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Figure 1: Study Approach
eration Centres (SOC). They identify several human, tech-
nical and managerial factors affecting the morale of the an-
alysts and suggest solutions. For validation, they present
some of their anthropological work [32], where they studied
the functioning of three different SOC’s.
The main distinction between our work and the related work
is that we do not only investigate risk analysis activities
leading to decision making, but we also identify factors con-
straining analysts decision making on risk from a socio-
technical perspective. Outside security literature, we note
that Eiser et al. [13] provides a good coverage on the inter-
pretation of risk from a natural disaster perspective.
3. APPROACH
The approach taken followed the series of activities illus-
trated in the Activity diagram in Figure 1. We began the
study with data eliciting interviews on vulnerability analy-
sis with security analysts. The interview data collected was
analysed and based on descriptions and illustrations (Fig-
ures 8, Appendix A) of work processes given by the ana-
lysts, Distributed Cognition models were produced. The
Distributed Cognition models were then presented to the
analysts for validation. Where inconsistencies were identi-
fied, corrections were suggested. In parallel to the elicita-
tion and creation of the Distributed Cognition models, we
coded and qualitatively analysed the data collected using
Grounded Theory.
4. DATA COLLECTION
4.1 Participants
We interviewed ten security analysts from three different
organisations. The organisations were recommended to us
by contacts that later introduced us to the organisations.
Organisations were selected on the basis of having a security
team that carried out vulnerability analysis.
Organisation A was a Higher Education Institution with
three permanent information security analysts supported
by team members from their IT (Information Technology)
services department, e.g. the Linux, Windows, and Or-
acle server teams. P1 and P2 (Participant) was a secu-
rity analyst and security manager in the permanent security
team respectively, while P3 to P5 were analysts from the
support teams. The professional experience of participants
within Organisation A ranged from two to over seven years
in the organisation, and they were responsible for over 1000
servers.
Organisation B was an information security practice with a
core team of information security analysts. P6 was the or-
ganisation technical director and P7 the head of group IT.
P6 and P7 had eleven and two years of professional expe-
rience in the organisation respectively and were responsible
for approximately 150 servers.
Organisation C was a public sector organisation; the three
security analysts (P8 - P10) interviewed were primarily fo-
cused on external engagements. Their work entailed vulner-
ability assessment, information assurance, and penetration
testing. Their professional experience in the organisation
ranged from eighteen months to five years.
4.2 Interview Method
All interviews were carried out over a period of four months
based on participant availability. Each interview was semi-
structured and driven by the goal of understanding the steps
taken during vulnerabilities analysis. The interviews were
held at the participant’s place of work; examples of guiding
questions asked included:
• What guidelines do you follow to help you manage
risk?
• How do you select vulnerabilities to act upon when
time and resources are limited?
• Are vulnerabilities identified as high or critical by the
scanners representative of your work environment?
• How do you identify false positives, and how do you
share information?
• What were the occasions when you had to accepted
risk?
• What kind of constraints have you experienced during
your work?
Using a participant information sheet each participant was
made aware of the purpose of the study beforehand, the ethi-
cal procedures to be followed and written consent was sought
before interviews could begin. Each interview lasted approx-
imately an hour, and was recorded and later transcribed.
The transcripts were coded and managed using Nvivo 11
Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQ-
DAS) tool. Throughout the paper, we present interview ex-
tracts as told by the participants to illustrate our findings.
5. DATA ANALYSIS
5.1 Distributed Cognition
Distributed Cognition is a cognitive theory based on the idea
that cognition is not limited to an individual’s inner men-
tal processes but facilitated by external structures such as
artefacts and the social context [16]. Whereas traditional
cognition solely focusses on an individual’s inner decision
making abilities, Distributed Cognition considers cognition
as shared among individual’s, with external structures, and
the relation between past and present events in facilitat-
ing decision making. This focus helps examine the socio-
technical system of which analysts are a part.
An aeroplane’s cockpit is a typical example of Distributed
Cognition at work. Whereas the actual flying of a plane
would be very difficult, the cockpit relieves the pilots load
through the careful positioning and operations of its con-
trols. For example, communication to the passengers and
crew is facilitated through an intercom, the flaps are con-
trolled by buttons, and wheels by gear levers as the pilot
remains sitting. The cockpit is a socio-technical system and
cognition is distributed among its artefacts and individuals
(co-pilot) to achieve a common goal. From a Human Com-
puter Interaction (HCI) perspective, Andrews et al. [3] dis-
cuss analysts use of to-do notes stuck on a computer monitor
to relieve memory load and in turn, elevate awareness. Here
the notes are as an external cognitive artefact, reducing the
analyst’s cognitive limitations.
Blandford and Furnis [6] identified that although Distributed
Cognition had been in use for several years, it lacked stan-
dard representational models to support its perspective on
interaction. To address this, they developed Distributed
Cognition for Teamwork (DiCoT): an approach for build-
ing models that capture information flow, physical layout,
social structures and artefacts of systems [6, 23]. Borrowing
from DiCoT, five models were developed from the collected
interview data. The interview data consisted of verbal de-
scriptions of work processes and illustrations drawn by the
analysts during the course of the interview. Figure 8 in Ap-
pendix A is one of the illustrations produced by the analysts.
Unlike Blandford and Furniss who mainly developed their
own diagrams, we chose to use UML [21] due to its ubiquity
and recognition within the IT practitioners community. The
five models we developed were:
1. A high level model describing the overall activities and
goals during vulnerability analysis.
2. A communication flow model illustrating communicat-
ing parties in vulnerability analysis.
3. An external awareness model highlighting third party
information used to assist in vulnerability analysis.
4. A vulnerability analysis model highlighting the steps
taken in vulnerability analysis.
5. A vulnerability response model highlighting decision
processes in addressing identified vulnerabilities.
We now present the generalised version of these Distributed
Cognition models.
5.2 Distributed Cognition Models
5.2.1 High Level Model
The high level model in Figure 2 summarises the main vul-
nerability analysis activities taking place in the study organ-
isations. The analysts typically concerned themselves with
proactive and reactive vulnerability analysis.
Proactive analysis entailed planned system vulnerability scans
where no malicious activities were apparent. These were ei-
ther regular weekly to monthly scans, or ad-hoc scans were
undertaken when new services and systems were coming on-
line.
Reactive analysis took place after malicious activities had
been detected. For example, Organisation A decided to
carry out a full network scan soon after its website had been
Table 1: Security Analyst Teams
Teams Scan Analysis Management
Analysts P2,P8,P9,P10 P3,P4,P5,P7 P1, P6
defaced. Nessus [33] was a common tool for vulnerability
detection in the organisations. Like most tools, Nessus had
its shortcomings that resulted in false positives. The most
prevalent of these was a false positive called backporting
on Linux servers. The analyst’s knowledge and experience
to identify false positives and the use of a variety of aware-
ness sources played an important part in vulnerability analy-
sis. While vulnerability remediation was the analyst’s over-
all goal, this was sometimes hindered by constraints later
described in Section 6.2.
Figure 2: High Level Model
5.2.2 Communication Flow Model
The communication flow model in Figure 3 illustrates the
passing of information used for decision making between the
analysts. It was noted that, in most cases, analysts belonged
to one of three teams (Table 1). The first was the Scan team;
they were responsible for configuring the scan parameters
and scanning the network infrastructure. The Scan team
monitored false positives and passed all scan results to the
Analysis team. The Analysis team was responsible for ver-
ifying the findings, identifying, and applying remediations.
Feedback was given to the Scan team on false positives, false
negatives, and selected responses to vulnerabilities. In situa-
tions of high uncertainty, the Analysis team sought approval
from the Management team before taking action. The Man-
agement team provided guidance to the other teams, action
approvals, requests justifications, and monitored activities.
Members of this team had significant experience in one or
both of the other teams.
A common trend in the organisations was the use of a col-
laboration and workflow management tools to support com-
munication, e.g. the ServiceNow product suite [29]. These
facilitate the posting and tracking of jobs and completion
status. From the communication flow, we see a consolidated
effort of passing information between teams to analyse and
act on vulnerabilities. Each team has a unique role and spe-
ciality, and they depend on communication tools to assist in
the process.
“They notify me from the system, and when the change is
happening, I get notified as well. It’s when they log it, so the
system itself notifies me when a change is going to happen”
[P2].
5.2.3 External Awareness Model
The external awareness model in Figure 4, focusses on infor-
mation that aided the analyst decision making. Other than
the vulnerability analysis reports produced by the scanners,
the analysts appeared to be highly dependent on informa-
Figure 3: Communication Flow Model
tion produced by sources external to the organisations for
their awareness, risk analysis and decision making.
“There are CERTs that will send us notifications on mali-
cious activity on the network if we sign up to them...” [P1].
Though this is not an exhaustive list, the external sources
of awareness identified from the interviews were penetration
test and vulnerability analysis findings from third parties,
CERT notifications, information from the general media,
and updates from vendors and threat intelligence communi-
ties. False negatives in scans were usually discovered using
external sources.
“...we identified new vulnerabilities so they were, therefore,
no tests for them in Nessus...Pen testing teams have identi-
fied some of these by trying our system” [P7].
Figure 4: External Awareness Model
5.2.4 Vulnerability Analysis Model
The vulnerability analysis model in Figure 5 illustrates the
activities the analysts took to identify and validate vulner-
abilities and the tools used to assist them in the process.
As indicated in Section 5.1, Distributed Cognition empha-
sises that cognition is not limited to an individual but fa-
cilitated by external structures. The vulnerability analysis
process illustrated this through the tools used by the ana-
lysts. For example, the analysts appeared to use more than
one tool to verify vulnerabilities.
“We manually scan for vulnerabilities using Kali Linux, and
then we verify the findings using Nessus as a backup” [P8].
The analysts also appeared to use a combination of tools to
check and verify false positives.
“Over time we have identified certain vulnerabilities where
we do not agree with the rating in Nessus. We will then
write exceptions in our system to change them. So when the
XML report is presented to our system, it knows that rating
is wrong” [P7].
“As Nessus doesn’t link scans, I keep a record of the false
positives in my Excel spreadsheet so if I see the vulnerability
occur again, I know to ignore it” [P2].
Once false positive filtering was completed by analysts, an
updated file was produced for remedial action. The common
trend was to address the critical and high vulnerabilities as
early as possible and leave other activities for later.
“If we got high or critical vulnerability that is found we im-
mediately raise a ticket into our support desk and we will
prioritise that to be fixed within 48 hours if possible...The
rest of them we lump into one ticket which we work on over
the rest of the month” [P7].
Figure 5: Vulnerability Analysis Model
5.2.5 Vulnerability Response Model
The vulnerability response model in Figure 6 illustrates the
steps analysts took to identify and apply suitable vulnera-
bility responses. The response process first identified who
was using the vulnerable software and its purpose.
“My team needs to investigate, how did it occur? What vul-
nerabilities were associated? What exploit kits went on the
machine? What was the capability? What else could have
happened? Did that machine have access to other networks
that held sensitive data?” [P1].
The analysts then checked for the availability of patches and
tested their compatibility in a test environment. In the event
that patches were unavailable, could not be applied or tests
had failed, alternative approaches to mitigating risks had to
be identified. These could be blocking ports or other forms
of isolating vulnerable services.
“We cannot control the plugins, and if we enforce Word-
press updates, the plugins will stop working. We have worked
around the problem by hosting the Wordpress websites off a
non-organisation domain” [P5].
When alternative mitigation strategies were unavailable or
unachievable, the risk was tolerated and monitored until a
strategy could be found.
“In that six months, we went and investigated alternative
ways of mitigating the risk and found there were no cost-
effective ways of doing that. We are happy to carry that risk
until a new system comes in, but for now, we are monitor-
ing” [P6].
5.3 Application of Grounded Theory
Figure 6: Vulnerability Response Model
Grounded Theory [10] was used as a complementary research
methodology as this has been used effectively to direct re-
searchers in identifying social phenomena associated with
security practices [1, 14]. While techniques such as Soft
Systems Methodology can equally be used to uncover hu-
man activity and relations in socio-technical systems, it lacks
the inductive abilities to interrogate data through thematic
analysis and identify significant patterns.
Grounded Theory employs the constant comparative method
where data collection, coding and memoing take place simul-
taneously. Emerging themes are constantly tested as codes
are generated [18]. By following this, data coding did not
wait for all fieldwork to be completed and theory generation
evolved as coding progressed [25].
The Strauss-Corbin approach to Grounded Theory subjects
elicited data to rounds of Open, Axial, and Selective coding.
5.3.1 Open Coding
During the Open coding phase, elicited data is broken down
into blocks of concepts based on their characteristics and
variations. Concepts are the categorisation of ideas con-
tained in the data [10]. To illustrate; the following two in-
terview quotes were assigned the code Assistive Tools, based
on the secondary tools the analysts used in addition to the
main ones.
“What we wanted was just a high level report...We need
something to present to management...I felt I couldn’t ma-
nipulate it in Nessus” [P2].
In this quote, the analyst was justifying the reason they
exported data from Nessus to Excel. They felt they required
a tool that could easily manipulate data into visual reports
for management use.
“We have an XML feed out into our in-house built system
Figure 7: Grounded Theory Code Summary
from Nessus. With the XML feed, it keeps a track of how
many of each category that we had...” [P7].
In this quote, the analyst was explaining how an in-house
built system was used to aid in tracking identified vulnera-
bilities by severity. While Nessus only presented the latest
scan results, this tool maintained multiple scan results fed
from Nessus.
Transcript data (interview quotes) may be assigned more
than a single code if other salient concepts are justifiable
[20]. Consequently, we also assigned the code Information
Sharing to P2’s quote above as it expressed the sharing of in-
formation within the organisation. After de-duplicating and
merging of related codes, a total of 18 codes were elicited;
these are listed in the Open coding column in Figure 7.
5.3.2 Axial Coding
In Axial coding, data codes from Open coding are pieced
together by identifying relationships between the concepts.
Much of the Axial coding takes place in parallel with Open
coding as relationships often become visible during this stage
[10]. The output of this stage was the assignment of six Axial
codes illustrated under the Axial coding column in Figure
7.
5.3.3 Selective Coding
Selective coding entails defining the Core Category (central
phenomenon) and basic social process. The Core Category
represents the main theme with greatest explanatory rele-
vance and highest potential for connecting other categories
[10]. The Core Category that emerged from our analysis
was Remediation as it best defined the activities of the Ba-
sic Social Process which was identified as the requirements
for vulnerability identification and remediation.
6. FINDINGS
As a result of Grounded Theory, four groups of factors emerged
that influenced the analyst’s interpretation of risk, and five
conditions constraining the analyst’s decision making. We
describe these in the sub-sections that follow.
6.1 Risk Interpretation Influencers
In Section 1, we stated that risk analysis is rarely a rational
process. Therefore, this implies that, for analysts to make
decisions on risk, they require factors that promote a sense
of rationality in the face of uncertainty. We identify these
factors as risk interpretation influencers. These may begin
to explain how analysts make rational decisions on risk while
using non-standardised approaches. Just as the presence
of these factors augments the interpretation of risk, their
absence limits interpretation.
6.1.1 Awareness
Awareness is defined as having knowledge or perception of a
situation. The analysts reported the need for awareness to
understand situations and make decisions on risk [11].
Awareness was gleaned from sources inside the organisations
by the sharing of information between colleagues.
“Mostly it is a shared as a ticket simply saying, hey guys,
we have identified this information, do you know about it?”
[P7],
or from third parties as identified in Section 5.2.3:
“We rely on the scanner, on its results depending on its rules.
What we will also do is have an intel feed. So based on this
we get a different view of vulnerabilities even if Nessus is
reporting it as medium or low” [P6].
The use of standards and guidelines was also perceived as a
means to promote awareness.
“We have a detailed assessment because we use ISO 27001.
Management has awareness of this, so they use it too as an
extra source of awareness” [P6].
“We use a version of Cyber Mission Impact Assessment in
vulnerability analysis” [P9].
The effects of low awareness for risk interpretation were ev-
ident when [P2] was asked on the level of trust they placed
in scan results.
“I do not have the awareness of all the systems, maybe if I
had been here an awful lot longer. It’s all context oriented”
[P2].
6.1.2 Communication
Communication provided assistance to the analysts in un-
derstanding risk, both as information shared and feedback;
the exchange of information and reports promoted clarity
for informed decision making [36, 7]. An Analysis team an-
alyst highlighted the importance of communication in the
following quote with their Scan team.
“What we do now, is we send them a list of the servers we
have updated and we tell them every package that was up-
dated is now not vulnerable up to the day they were patched”
[P5].
Communication was facilitated either by email or more ad-
vanced collaborative tools depending on the organisation
and team.
“We communicate through our system which logs everything.
So our team also feeds the scanning team. If we see a lot of
false positives, we tell them to add it to their list” [P7].
The analyst further cited regular communication with the
management teams as assurance they were doing things cor-
rectly.
“Mostly it is via a bi-weekly meeting, but if it is something
very important, then we have a distribution group and we
will discuss it by email” [P7].
6.1.3 Tool Capabilities
Tool capabilities define the effectiveness of the tools used by
the analysts in the identification and verification of vulner-
abilities. Through these capabilities, the analysts were able
to ascertain the presence of risks. Rarely was a single tool
sufficient to validate the presence of vulnerabilities.
“Nessus gives me the vulnerable software version but it does
not give me the complete version number. Nagios does that...”
[P2].
Where tool-support was not available, the impact was usu-
ally evident;
“Without creating and updating the spreadsheet, I have no
way of knowing if it’s a false positive or not” [P2].
6.1.4 Individual Capabilities
Despite the presence of tools to identify and validate vulner-
abilities, the responsibility for decision making about risk lay
primary on the analyst’s personal capabilities. These capa-
bilities were considered the combination of factors such as
experience and training.
“A lot of the decisions are based on the experience of peo-
ple in that group and their knowledge of risk and the busi-
ness...but we are relying on expertise and awareness of those
people” [P6].
“There was one the other day to do with exploiting Java code
through a certain call. Now I wasn’t sure whether that call
was used or not because most of it is in the vendor supported
side of things...I just patched it anyway” [P5].
The impact of limited individual capabilities was observed
also when [P2] explained the level of trust they placed in
scan results.
“As far as I am concerned, we have to take the scan results
as almost gospel” [P2].
6.2 Constrained Conditions to Risk Decision
Making
Goal conflict situations were identified that forced analysts
to address risks under constrained conditions. Risk inter-
pretation influencers did not address the conflicts suitably,
resulting in difficult decision making. The constrained con-
ditions usually resulted in the failure to enforce security ob-
jectives due to the effects of contextual mismatches that were
not carefully considered during the specification of security
and organisational goals. As a result of Grounded Theory
coding, five classifications of the goal conflicts emerged. We
present the five goal conflicts leading to constrained decision
making below.
6.2.1 Business Process
A business process is defined as an activity or set of ac-
tivities that accomplish specific organisational goals. The
Business Process goal conflict was identified, when analysts
were constrained in addressing and acting upon a risk due
to the requirements of essential business processes. In one
reported event, an analyst had to allow lower security config-
urations for some users, as the higher ones were in conflict
with the user’s requirements. In another event, users re-
quired new business processing tools that seemed harmless
on their own, but their overall security implications, when
used with other tools, were unclear.
“Sometimes the application team will say, can we have this
application, please. I was installing it and one of the appli-
cation steps was disable SE Linux. So I asked my boss about
this and he said go ahead but write them a note that you are
not happy about it” [P5].
“The developer team are using software which they use for
their internal collaboration and they want to use video, but
we are unsure how they are going to use the video...we are
going to review it in six months and if we find that they are
using it in a way that is a risk to the business...we would
shut it down despite the fact that it is a good tool to them”
[P7].
The remarks and actions taken by the analysts indicate the
acceptance of risk, although [P7] took the extra step of defin-
ing the risk acceptance time frame.
6.2.2 Data Encryption
The data encryption goal conflict was identified, when the
analyst’s addressing of risk was constrained by legal, stan-
dard or contractual obligations to protect data, versus the
requirement to share to achieve a business objective. For in-
stance, an organisation may implement the security goal to
encrypt all transmissions of personal identifiable data as one
way of conforming with the data protection act [9]. How-
ever, goal conflicts arise when this information has to be
shared with entities lacking encryption capabilities. An an-
alyst expressed how a third party IT support service they
used had requested the transfer of user validation data un-
encrypted, while another expressed how they had resorted
to unencrypted data transfers with clients that had no en-
cryption capabilities.
“We send them a list of our user’s names and their details
so they can change the password. If a user calls up say-
ing they want to change their password, we ask them some
security questions...We were asked to send this through an
unencrypted document...We said we are sorry, we refuse to
do that because we will be breaking data protection laws” [P5].
“We do have challenges around client capabilities. So if we
want to send an encrypted message and they do not have
PGP or an encrypted Dropbox, then we have to come to an
agreement on how to share that information” [P6].
The quotes show that the two analysts chose to act differ-
ently based on their understanding of the situation and the
sensitivity of the data.
6.2.3 Project Management
Time, cost and human resource are vital ingredients of a
successful project. Without these, projects risk failure [28].
The Project Management goal conflict arose when resource
allocations were not in line with the maintenance of security
goals. Systems typically have an end of life where replace-
ments are required due to advances and improved security.
When this point is reached, time and resources are required
to upgrade systems and maintain security goal.
An analyst described the continual running of an outdated
and unpatched Windows 2003 servers, as they lacked the
time and personnel to oversee their migration. Similarly,
another analyst described permitting the use of an outdated
version of the secure socket layer (SSL) for a specified period,
due to the time updating work was going to take.
“We know we have a number of 2003 servers that need to
migrate to the latest version of Windows server and the rea-
son that does not happen overnight is because of a conflict of
interest in terms of products but also because of the services
that sit on these” [P1].
“We found that fixing it was going to take a significant amount
of time while there was a new system being built in six months,
so it would be better spending the time configuring the new
system correctly” [P6].
6.2.4 Insufficient Privileges
Risk analysis depends on privileged access to devices and
services for assessment and remediation. Studies have shown
that privileged access is essential [26], but may sometimes
be difficult to obtain [15]. The Insufficient Privileges goal
conflict was identified based on access restrictions. In one in-
stance, the organisational Bring Your Own Device (BYOD)
policy restricted the amount of access analysts had, as de-
vices were personally owned. While in another, the conflict
was a result of access restrictions set by vendors on their
products.
“That scan will hit our entire infrastructure but we focus on
the stuff that is in our control. So we scan the organisation
servers...desktops, the network routers and switches and es-
sentially anything connected to our network. Anything that
falls outside stuff that is managed by IT, like personal lap-
tops, is hard to remediate” [P1].
“We use Qualys for our external servers and website, but
Qualys tend to talk back to its cloud service (vendor run)
...If you have a Qualys system on your network, it belongs
to them so you cannot change the system configuration” [P7].
6.2.5 Third Party Dependency
Third party dependency goal conflicts were situations when
a constraint arose as a result of a third parties failure to
provide complete support for their products and services. A
notable number of IT products and services in use are either
wholly outsourced from third parties or provided by a group
of third parties. Established vendors like Microsoft and Or-
acle usually supports their services and make updates avail-
able routinely or on request. Less established vendors and
open source projects prefer a collaborative approach main-
taining different parts of products and systems. Analysts
identified that although the use of such collaborative prod-
ucts was essential, problems ensued when some collaborators
stopped supporting the products.
“We have a product that uses Apache and there is a vulner-
ability that needs to be patched in Apache. Unfortunately,
it is vendor supported, and the vendor does not support that
version of Apache, so we have got to accept it, to be in line
with the vendor application” [P4].
“Glassfish used to be an open source project and was bought
out by Oracle. The product we have has the open source side
of things. We had a CVE come the other day which said, to
fix, we have to move to a new version supported by Oracle.
We cannot do that because the vendor only supports the open
source version of it” [P4].
7. DISCUSSION
The work was motivated by the question: how do security
analysts make decisions about risk, given that risk analysis
is rarely a rational process? Our findings show that deci-
sion making on risk is a matter of consolidated effort be-
tween analysts, artefacts, and facilitated by communication
and awareness. This interplay was uncovered by the socio-
technical research approach taken using Distributed Cog-
nition. Through this, the research focus moved from the
limited analysis of the analysts, to a wider context where
the roles in facilitating risk analysis and decision making in
the socio-technical environment were considered. From the
Distributed Cognition models developed, significant aspects
of risk analysis where highlighted that would have other-
wise been overlooked. These include the use of primary and
secondary tools to improve vulnerability analysis, the coor-
dinated roles that teams play, the vital role that technology-
facilitated communication plays, and the distribution of in-
formation from external sources to improve awareness.
Although Distributed Cognition brought the interactions be-
tween analysts and artefacts during risk analysis to light, it
is not suitable for data interrogating. Grounded Theory was
used as a complementary research methodology to address
this need. Traditional Grounded Theory requires multiple
interviews be taken before theoretical saturation is reached.
However theoretical saturation was reached by the seventh
interviews as the primary methodology was Distributed Cog-
nition uncovering the interplay in the socio-technical envi-
ronment.
As an overall, coding identified that the analyst’s main ob-
jective was to remediate vulnerabilities. To achieve this, four
risk interpretation influencers; Individual Capabilities, Tool
Capabilities, Communication and Awareness were used. While
most of these are within individual or organisational control,
such as the improvement of tools, training and communica-
tion to improve risk analysis, there is little that can be done
to improve awareness from external sources or guarantee
that sources will have essential information when required.
Conditions that constrain risk decision making were identi-
fied from analysis and five categories emerged from coding;
Business Process, Data Encryption, Project Management,
Insufficient Privileges and Third Party Dependency. The
five are not presented as an exhaustive list and may dif-
fer in other studies. We identified that these conditions are
a result of goal conflict resulting from mismatches in secu-
rity and organisational requirements when the context is not
carefully considered in planning. Our assumption was that
constraints the analyst’s encounter would originate from ex-
ternal sources. However, the findings show that the main
constraints the analyst’s encountered, were problems origi-
nating from within the organisations.
We believe that if careful consideration is given to context
when planning security and organisational goals, the con-
straints can be controlled or avoided. For example, if an
organisation plans to use a particular application for their
business processes, they may want to identify the security
requirements and other factors that may have implications
in the enforcing of the requirements in the short and long
term. In other words, defining security requirements has
far-reaching implications than the identification of vulnera-
bilities and controls. Goal conflicts that introduce security
risks should be understood and considered early in require-
ments analysis.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we illustrated how Distributed Cognition and
Grounded Theory can be used to identify the understanding
and approach to risk analysis used by security analysts. In
doing so, we have presented the idea of folk risk analysis:
a non-standardised approach used in risk analysis based on
one’s understanding. We have identified factors that influ-
ence risk interpretation and constraints encountered.
Our findings suggest the need to consider methods of pro-
moting risk interpretation influencers when designing inter-
active systems for analysts. It must also be understood that
the identification and implementation of security require-
ments is not an end in itself, but the wider implications of
goals and context must be taken into account.
The constraints identified, helped us address the earlier posed
questions from the work by Beautement et al [5]. Do security
analysts view aspects of risk analysis as tradable resources,
and how may these be identified? We have established that
security analysts are willing to trade compliance aspects of
risk analysis. e.g. the willingness to remove encryptions
when clients lack the capability.
A limitation of our work is that it focuses only on the vulner-
ability analysis practices of security analysts, whereas risk
may be analysed in a variety of ways depending on the se-
curity practice employed.
In future work, we will incorporate the risk interpretation
influencers and methods for identifying goal conflicts into
formative evaluation guidelines when designing for security
analysts. We will also carry out additional interviews with
analysts concerned with other security activities that entail
some form of risk analysis. This will increase the generalis-
ability of our findings.
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11. APPENDIX A
Figure 8: Sample Illustration of Work Process
